"the essence of modern science, which has become world-wide meanwhile as European science, is grounded in the thinking of the Greeks, which since Plato has been called philosophy." (Heidegger 1977: 157) In China, on the other hand, epistemology never became a significant philosophical factor. To the (limited) extent that epistemological considerations were present, they tended to be secondary and often characterized by skepticism.2 Scientific, or rather, technological innovations certainly took place in the Chinese Empire under a Confucian-led ideology, but they did so despite the lack of systematic epistemological theorizing.
A yet important aspect concerns the extent to which science enjoyed independent status in the West and in China. During the modern age in Europe, the natural sciences broke loose from both philosophy and religion, and became largely a separate sphere of human activity. While their formal justification was still Baconian in the sense that they were generally understood (and respected) as an effort to improve the human being's living conditions on the planet, their capabilities were not significantly limited by moral and political decisions. At least such demands did not become prevalent before the latter part of the twentieth century. In many ways, they were allowed to override the immediate and long-term moral interests of humankind. Morality had become secondary; knowledge and technological mastery primary.3
Philosophy in China developed in a period of almost three full centuries of incessant warfare and human misery, and it is therefore understandable that the early philosophical focus was on social order and ways to obtain social stability. When circumstances were different, however, i.e. in times of relative disciple, Hans-Georg Gadamer, however, suggests that it is rather our understanding of the ancient masters that has been distorted by the scientist turn in modern philosophy. Hence, he offers a different interpretation that, at least in the field of humanities, eschews this epistemological insistence upon indisputable truths, observing, for instance, that "Aristotle contrasts 'ethos' with 'physis' as a field which, while not wholly disorderly, cannot be associated with the orderliness of nature, but the volatility and the limited regularity of human statutes and human conduct." (Gadamer 1990: 318) 
